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Abstract
This paper builds on the analysis of Panousi and Reis of a linear capital taxation model
where households face undiversiable capital income risk and labor income risk. It highlights
the relevance of consumption taxes in this framework. This paper provides a theoretical
and a numerical analysis of the optimal scal policy in response to capital income shocks
and labor income shocks. The results show that consumption taxes have the same capa-
bility of providing insurance as capital income taxes, without the downside of a¤ecting the
householdscapital decision. In this setting, the consumption tax should be used to reduce
the volatility in income and in consumption, and the optimal capital income tax is zero.
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Resumo
Esta tese alicerça-se no modelo de Panousi e Reis, no qual é determinada a forma
óptima de tributar o capital num contexto em que existe incerteza relativamente ao retorno
do capital e ao retorno do trabalho. É realçada a importância que a utilização de um
imposto sobre o consumo pode ter neste âmbito. Esta tese deriva em termos teóricos e
analisa numericamente a tributação óptima em resposta a choques no retorno do capital e
no retorno do trabalho. Os resultados demonstram que a tributação do consumo constitui
uma alternativa à tributação do capital, na medida em que permite reduzir a incerteza
sem afectar a decisão óptima de capital. Neste modelo, a política scal óptima consiste
na utilização da tributação do consumo com o propósito de diminuir a volatilidade do
rendimento das famílias e do seu consumo, juntamente com a não tributação do capital.
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1 Introduction
Over the years, several economists have focused their work on optimal taxation problems.
One recurrent result found in the literature is that capital income should not be taxed.
For instance, Chamley (1986) has shown that, in general equilibrium models with innitely
lived agents, the optimal capital income tax should be zero in the long run. On this matter,
Lucas (1990) also argued that capital income should not be taxed. After looking at the
data for the U.S., Lucas estimated that the elimination of the tax on capital income would
increase signicantly the capital stock. Consequently, there would be welfare gains, even
though these gains would be downsized due to diminishing returns on capital.
However, this result is not universally veried. Several economists have shown that
there are scenarios and market structures that justify the optimality of a capital income tax
or capital income subsidy even in the long run. For instance, Aiyagari (1995) showed that
the existence of incomplete insurance markets and borrowing constraints lead to a positive
steady-state capital income tax. The sign of this tax is justied by the fact that both these
specicities induce savings and capital accumulation. Aiyagari proved it was optimal to
set a positive capital income tax to reduce capital accumulation. Correia (1996) presented
another exception to the Chamley theorem(1986). Correia showed that when there are
no restrictions on the taxation of all factors of production, the zero tax on capital income
remains optimal. However, whenever one of the production factors cannot be taxed directly,
capital income tax should be di¤erent from zero. Finally, Panousi and Reis (2016) provided
another framework where it is optimal to have capital income taxes di¤erent from zero in
the long run. They showed that in the presence of idiosyncratic income risk capital income
taxes can be used as insurance with the purpose of decreasing uncertainty in this model.
In this paper, we build on the Panousi and Reis (2016) stochastic model for a closed
economy as we strive to understand if there is any alternative or complementary congura-
tion of scal policy that increases welfare in this economy. We will preserve the underlying
assumption that the householdsinvestment decision does not depend on the realization of
uncertainty to keep the tractability of the model. On the contrary, the householdsdecision
over consumption is made after the households have full information regarding the shocks
they are subject to in the current period.
The theoretical and quantitative results of our work suggest a relevant role for the
consumption tax in this model. We conclude that in the presence of uncertainty regarding
capital income, the optimal scal policy consists in the taxation of consumption as a mean
to decrease volatility in consumption. Furthermore, contrary to what is veried in Panousi
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and Reis (2016), if the instability in income and in consumption is only induced by shocks
in labor income there is a role for scal policy. We can use consumption taxes constant over
time to diminish the variability of consumption without distorting the investment decision.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we describe our model, in particular we
characterize the households, the rms, the government and the markets. In section 3, we
derive the competitive equilibrium solution for our stochastic model. Section 4 derives
the rst best for this economy. Section 5 solves the benevolent governments problem to
determine the optimal way to use scal policy in order to maximize the welfare in our
economy. In section 6, we subject our economy to capital income shocks and labor income
shocks, individually and jointly, to analyze the optimal scal policy in each framework.
Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 The model
In this section, we consider a neoclassical stochastic model for a closed economy, which is
a modied version of Panousi and Reis (2016). Time is discrete and indexed by t. There
is a continuum of identical innitely lived households of size unity. In each period, there
is uncertainty regarding the remuneration of capital and the remuneration of labor. When
a household is subject to an idiosyncratic capital income shock (t), its pre tax rate of
return of capital may increase or decrease by an amount t. Additionally, if a household
faces a labor income shock ("t), it increases or decreases the households remuneration of
labor by "t. We maintain the simplifying assumption that the decision of capital investment
is made before the realization of uncertainty. Therefore, the income risk has an e¤ect on
the consumption of households but not on the investment decision. Moreover, we consider
that the income shocks (t and "t) are independent and identically distributed over time,
so that the expectations of the households are not inuenced by previous shocks. In this
framework, we consider that the rms are owned by households. However, we do not need
to take into account prots since we assume that rms behave competitively and there are
constant returns to scale in production. Lastly, we introduce an additional scal instrument
to the model of Panousi and Reis (2016): a non state contingent consumption tax. The
purpose of this consumption tax is to increase e¢ ciency in our economy.
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2.1 The households
Taking into consideration the assumption that households are identical prior to the real-
ization of the uncertainty, each household will solve the same maximization problem. The
households derive utility from consumption (Ct). The preferences of each household are
described by the following sum of discounted expected utilities:
U =
1X
t=0
tE [u(Ct)] (1)
where 0 <  < 1 is the factor at which the households discount future consumption.
The utility function, u(), is strictly increasing (uc;t > 0) and strictly concave (ucc;t < 0)
and the Inada conditions are veried.
Every period t  0, for each unit of work households receive a wage, wt, plus an in-
dividual labor income shock, "t. If households transfer consumption between periods they
receive a rate of return, rt, which is taxed at the non state contingent tax rate kt , and an
individual capital income shock, t, which is subject to the same non state contingent tax
rate kt . Capital is depreciated at rate, . Households can choose to spend their disposable
income in consumption, Ct, which is taxed at the non state contingent tax rate,  ct , or in in-
vestment. Additionally, households have to pay lump-sum taxes, Tt. Thus, the households
budget constraint for each period t can be written as:
Ct(t; "t)(1 + 
c
t) +Kt+1 + Tt = wt + "t + (1  )Kt + (1  kt )(rt + t)Kt
Given the initial stock of capital K0 and the shocks to which they are subject to
in every period ft; "tg1t=0 , households choose consumption and capital in each period,
fCt;Kt+1g1t=0, to maximize their utility subject to their individual budget constraints.
Hence, the Lagrangian for the householdsproblem is given by:
L =
1X
t=0
tE
"
u(Ct(t; "t))  t(t; "t)
(
Ct(t; "t)(1 + 
c
t) +Kt+1 + Tt   wt   "t
 (1  )Kt   (1  kt )(rt + t)Kt
)#
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The rst order condition for consumption, Ct(t; "t), for t  0, is given by:
t(t; "t) =
u0(Ct(t; "t))
1 +  ct
The rst order condition with respect to capital, Kt+1, for t  0, is given by:
E [ t(t; "t)] = E
h
t+1(t+1; "t+1)
h
(1 + (1  kt+1)(rt+1 + t)  
ii
The optimal solution to the householdsproblem is summarized by the following equa-
tions:
Ct(t; "t)(1 + 
c
t) +Kt+1 + Tt = wt + "t + (1  )Kt + (1  kt )(rt + t)Kt (2)
E

u0(Ct(t; "t))
1 +  ct

= E

u0(Ct+1(t+1; "t+1))
1 +  ct+1
h
1 + (1  kt+1)(rt+1 + t)  
i
(3)
Equation (2) is the households budget constraint, and equation (3) is the Euler equation
that describes the evolution of capital along its optimal path.
2.2 The rms
The rms are perfectly competitive, so they behave as price takers and maximize their
prots in each period given the pre taxes prices of the productive factors, rt and wt. The
technology used in production uses labor and capital as inputs:
Yt = F (Kt; lt)
We assume that the production function exhibits constant returns to scale, is increasing
(Fk(Kt; lt) > 0 and Fl(Kt; lt) > 0) and concave (Fkk(Kt; lt) < 0 and Fll(Kt; lt) < 0) in both
factors of production and that the Inada conditions are veried.
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The optimal solution to the rmsmaximization of prots implies equality between the
remuneration of factors and their respective marginal productivity in each period:
Fl(Kt; lt) = wt (4)
Fk(Kt; lt) = rt (5)
2.3 The government
We consider that the government is able to use lump sum taxes or lump sum transfers to
balance its budget. Additionally, the government has available two other scal instruments,
proportional non-state contingent time varying consumption taxes ( ct) and proportional
non-state contingent time varying capital income taxes (kt ), that can be used to increase
e¢ ciency in this economy. Thus, the governments budget constraint can be written as:
Tt = E
h
  ct Ct(t; "t)  kt (rt + t) Kt
i
=   ctE[Ct(t; "t)]  kt rtKt (6)
2.4 Market clearing conditions
The equilibrium solution for this economy requires that all markets are in equilibrium.
Thus, in every period t  0, we must have equilibrium in the goods market, meaning that
the following resource constraint must be veried:
E [Ct(t; "t)] +Kt+1  Kt(1  ) = F (Kt; lt) (7)
Moreover, it is required equilibrium in the labor market, which implies that the labor
demand must be equal to the labor supply. In this model, we assume that the labor supply
is inelastic and equal to one. Hence, we should consider an additional market clearing
condition, that must be veried in every period:
lt = 1 (8)
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3 Competitive equilibrium
Denition 1 A competitive equilibrium is a set of allocations fCt;Kt+1g1t=0 , prices fwt; rtg1t=0
and taxes

 ct ; 
k
t ; Tt
	1
t=0
such that: (i) the households maximize their lifetime expected util-
ity subject to their budget constraints, taking prices and taxes as given; (ii) rms maximize
their prots subject to the technology constraints, taking prices as given; (iii) the government
satises its budget constraint in every period; and (iv) markets clear.
Given this, conditions (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7) and (8) are su¢ cient to characterize
the competitive equilibrium for our economy. We are able to summarize these equilibrium
conditions in the following equations:
Ct(t; "t)(1 + 
c
t) +Kt+1    ctE[Ct(t; "t)] = F (Kt; 1) + "t + (1  )Kt + (1  kt )tKt (9)
E

u0(Ct(t; "t))
1 +  ct

= E

u0(Ct+1(t+1; "t+1))
1 +  ct+1
n
1 + (1  kt+1)(Fk(Kt+1; 1) + t+1)  
o
(10)
The equation (9) is the householdsbudget constraint written as an individual resource
constraint. In this model, we have an individual resource constraint instead of an aggregate
resource in the sense that each household faces di¤erent income shocks. Condition (10) is the
Euler equation that characterizes the investment decision in our economy. This condition
is the same for every household due to our assumption that the investment decisions are
made before the realization of the shocks, meaning that they are not conditioned by them.
4 First Best
In this section, we dene the rst best solution for our economy. We derive the solution
of this problem through the maximization of the householdslifetime utility subject to the
aggregate resource constraint:
maxU =
1X
t=0
tE [u(Ct(t; "t))] s:t: E [Ct(t; "t)] +Kt+1 = F (Kt; 1) + (1  )Kt
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Thus, the Lagrangian for this problem can be written as follows:
L =
1X
t=0
tE [u(Ct(t; "t))]  t fE [Ct(t; "t)] +Kt+1   F (Kt; 1)  (1  )Ktg
The rst order condition for consumption, Ct(t; "t), for t  0, is given by:
tu0 (Ct(t; "t)) = t;
which implies that Ct(t; "t) is the same for all shocks so Ct(t; "t) = Ct:
The rst order condition for consumption, Kt+1, for t  0, is given by:
 t + t+1(1 + Fk(Kt+1; 1)  ) = 0
Hence, the rst best solution can be summarized by the following equation:
E

u0 (Ct)

= E

u0 (Ct+1)

(1 + Fk(Kt+1; 1)  ) (11)
In the rst best situation, the optimal level of consumption and the investment decision
are equal for all households independently of the shocks they may face in each individual
period. Using scal policy, this outcome can be replicated with a proportional consumption
tax. Through the taxation of consumption, we can reduce the volatility in consumption,
since we reduce the disposable income in the good state of nature more than the disposable
income in the bad state of nature. Furthermore, as we distribute the government revenues
as lump-sum transfers the expected value of consumption remains unchanged.
5 Planners Problem
In this section, we derive the optimal taxation policy for our stochastic economy. We
consider a benevolent government that is able to choose the allocations that maximize the
welfare in our economy.
The problem the benevolent government has to solve is the maximization of the lifetime
utility of the households subject to the competitive equilibrium conditions. Hence, the
Lagrangian for this problem can be written as:
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L =
X
tE
"
u(Ct(t; "t))  t(t; "t)
(
Ct(t; "t)(1 + 
c
t) +Kt+1    ctE [Ct(t; "t)] 
F (Kt; 1)  "t   (1  )Kt   (1  kt )tKt
)#
 
X
ttE

u0 (Ct(t; "t))
1 +  ct

+
X
t+1tE
"
u0
 
Ct+1(t+1; "t+1)

1 +  ct+1

1 +

1  kt+1
 
Fk(Kt+1; 1) + t+1
  #
The rst order condition for consumption, Ct(t; "t), for t  0, is given by:
u0 (Ct(t; "t)) = t(t; "t)(1 + 
c
t) + t
u00 (Ct(t; "t))
1 +  ct
(12)
 t 1E

u00 (Ct(t; "t))
1 +  ct

1 +

1  kt

[Fk(Kt; 1) + t]  

The rst order condition with respect to capital, Kt+1, for t  0, is given by:
E [t(t; "t)] = E
h
t+1(t+1; "t+1)
h
1 + Fk(Kt+1; 1) + (1  kt )t+1   
ii
(13)
+tE
"
u0
 
Ct+1(t+1; "t+1)

1 +  ct+1

1  kt+1

Fkk(Kt+1; 1)
#
The rst order condition with respect to the non state contingent capital income tax,
kt+1 , for t  0, is given by:
E

t+1(t+1; "t+1)t+1Kt+1

=  tE
"
u0
 
Ct+1(t+1; "t+1)

1 +  ct+1

Fk(Kt+1; 1) + t+1
#
(14)
Finally, the rst order condition with respect to the non state contingent consumption
tax,  ct , for t  0, is given by:
8
E [t(t; "t)(Ct(t; "t)  E[Ct(t; "t])] =  tE
"
 u
0 (Ct(t; "t))
(1 +  ct)
2
#
(15)
+t 1E
"
 u
0 (Ct(t; "t))
(1 +  ct)
2

1 +

1  kt

[Fk(Kt; 1) + t]  
#
5.1 Optimal taxation policy
Lemma 1 The Euler equation never binds, if and only if the capital income tax is always
equal to zero.
Proof. Firstly, we consider that the capital income tax is zero and derive the planners
problem without using the Euler equation (10) as a restriction. The rst order conditions
for consumption (Ct(t; "t)) and capital (Kt+1) in this maximization problem can be written
as:
u0 (Ct(t; "t)) = t(t; "t)(1 + 
c
t)
E [t(t; "t)] = E

t+1(t+1; "t+1)

1 + Fk(Kt+1; 1) + t+1   

Together these rst order conditions imply that equation (10) is veried:
E

u0(Ct(t; "t))
1 +  ct

= E

u0(Ct+1(t+1; "t+1))
1 +  ct+1
[1 + Fk(Kt+1; 1) + t   ]

Thus, we know that when the capital income tax is zero the multiplier associated with
the Euler equation (10), t, is zero.
Then, we consider that the multiplier associated with the Euler equation (10), t, is
zero. Given this assumption, we can use the expression of the multiplier associated with
the individual resource constraint (9) for period t + 1 (t+1) to write the derivative of the
Lagrangian with respect to the capital income tax as:
@L
@kt+1
=  t+1E t+1t+1Kt+1 =  t+1E
"
u0
 
Ct+1(t+1; "t+1)

1 +  ct+1
t+1Kt+1
#
(16)
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Under the optimal taxation policy, it is optimal to tax consumption at the highest
rate possible. When the consumption tax is innite, the derivative of the Lagrangian with
respect to the capital income tax (16) is zero. Consequently, we should set the capital
income tax to zero in this set up. Therefore, we conclude that when the Euler equation
does not bind the optimal capital income tax is zero
Proposition 1 In the presence of idiosyncratic capital or labor income risk, the optimal
consumption tax is innite and the optimal capital income tax is zero.
Proof. We are going to assume that the Euler equation is not binding (t = 0). Given this,
we can write the derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to the consumption tax ( ct) as:
@L
@ ct
=  tE [t(t; "t)(Ct(t; "t)  E[Ct(t; "t])]
From the rst order condition for consumption (Ct(t; "t)), we derive that the multiplier
associated with the individual resource constraint (t(t; "t)) is given by:
t(t; "t) =
u0 (Ct(t; "t))
1 +  ct
Using the expression above for the multiplier associated with the individual resource
constraint, we are able to rewrite the derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to the
consumption tax as:
@L
@ ct
=  tE

u0 (Ct(t; "t))
1 +  ct
(Ct(t; "t)  E[Ct(t; "t])

=  tCov

u0 (Ct(t; "t))
1 +  ct
; Ct(t; "t)

The optimal taxation policy regarding the consumption tax depends on the sign of this
derivative. Given the properties of the utility function that we considered, we know that
the marginal utility of consumption decreases with consumption. Therefore, we know that
the covariance between consumption (Ct(t; "t)) and its marginal utility (u
0 (Ct(t; "t))) is
negative. Consequently, the rst order condition for  ct is positive, which means that it is
optimal to set  ct as high as possible, to innite if have no additional restrictions.
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We need to check that if  = 0 and  c is innite, then the rst order condition for the
capital income tax is met, so all rst order conditions are met. We are able to prove that
using the expression of the multiplier associated with the individual resource constraint for
the period t+ 1 (t+1(t+1; "t+1)) and equation (14):
E

t+1(t+1; "t+1)t+1Kt+1

= 0() E
"
u0
 
Ct+1(t+1; "t+1)

1 +  ct+1
t+1Kt+1
#
= 0
As we have seen, it is optimal to tax consumption at the highest rate possible. When
the consumption tax is innitely large, the derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to the
capital income tax is equal to zero. Since it is optimal to set the capital income tax to zero,
our initial assumption holds, in other words the Euler equation does not bind.
Corollary 1 Under the optimal policy (consumption tax is innite and capital income tax
is zero), the economy is in the rst best.
Proof. From the individual resource constraint (9), we know that when the consumption
tax is innite consumption is constant and equal to average consumption.
lim
ct!1
Ct(t; "t)(1 + 
c
t)
 ctE[Ct(t; "t)]
= lim
ct!1
 ctE[Ct(t; "t)]
 ctE[Ct(t; "t)]
+ lim
ct!1
F (Kt; 1) + "t + (1  )Kt + (1  kt )tKt  Kt+1
 ctE[Ct(t; "t)]
() lim
ct!1
Ct(t; "t)
E[Ct(t; "t)]
= 1
Furthermore, under the optimal policy, the rst order condition with respect to capital
in the planners problem (13) and the rst order condition with respect to capital in the
rst best (11) are equal:
E

u0 (Ct(t; "t))
1 +  ct

= E

u0 (Ct(t; "t))
1 +  ct+1
h
1 + Fk(Kt+1; 1) + (1  kt )t+1   
i
() E u0 (Ct(t; "t)) = E u0  Ct+1(t+1; "t+1) (1 + Fk(Kt+1; 1)  )
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In conclusion, under the optimal scal policy, we are able to fully eliminate the volatil-
ity in consumption. In other words, every household has the same level of consumption
independently of the income shocks they are subject to in each period. Therefore, we are
able to achieve the best welfare situation for our economy.
6 Numerical simulation
In this section, we simulate numerically the steady state for our economy in order to further
analyze the optimal taxation policy in this framework. In particular, we consider what is
the optimal taxation policy if, for exogenous reasons, the consumption tax is not allowed
to be innite. In this case, we will set the consumption tax as high as possible, but we may
use the capital income tax to reduce consumption volatility.
6.1 Model specication and parameterization
The technology is dened by a Cobb-Douglas production function, where the income share
of capital, , is equal to 0.5 and the total productivity factor, A, is equal to 1. The
rate at which the capital is depreciated, , is equal to 0.25. Furthermore, we considered
that households discount future consumption at a rate, , equal to 0.8. Lastly, the utility
function we used in this analysis is isoelastic, with a coe¢ cient of risk aversion, , equal to
1.5. Considering this parameterization of our economy, we then modelized uncertainty in
such a way that in each period there are two possible states of nature that occur with equal
probability.
6.2 Optimal taxation policy with only capital income risk
Firstly, we considered that in each period households were only subject to capital income
shocks (). Given our simplifying assumption regarding the possible states of nature, we
have that in each period households face either a positive capital income shock ( = ) or
a negative capital income shock ( =  ). In other words, the householdspre tax rate of
return of capital can increase  or decrease  in each period. In gures 1 and 2, we consider
that  is equal to 0.5.
Figure 1 illustrates the optimal taxation policy when households face only capital in-
come risk. The optimal capital income tax decreases as we increase the consumption tax.
Moreover, through the taxation of consumption we are able to raise the steady state level
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of capital. This happens because there is a trade-o¤ between the capital income tax and
the consumption tax. The purpose of the capital income tax in this model is to provide
insurance against the idiosyncratic capital income risk, since it reduces the volatility in in-
come and consequently the volatility in consumption. If we reduce the consumption tax we
decrease the insurance capability of this scal instrument. However, at the same time we
are increasing the capital income tax, which can also be used as an instrument to diminish
volatility in our stochastic model. However, using the capital income tax has a cost since it
also a¤ects capital accumultation. Notice that although we vary the maximum consumption
tax between 0 and 100%, the optimal capital income tax does not vary much.
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Figure 1: Optimal consumption tax with capital income risk
Figure 2 conrms the results obtained in Section 5.1. If we have no restrictions on the
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level of the consumption tax, the rst best is attainable. As seen, the optimal taxation
policy is not to tax capital and to tax consumption at an innitely large rate. However,
we see that it takes an incredibly large consumption tax to reach our limit result. If this
scenario was feasible, the steady state level of capital would converge to the rst best level
of capital, and the volatility of consumption would be fully eliminated. Thus, we would
achieve the best possible welfare in our economy.
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Figure 2: Optimal consumption tax with capital income risk, as the maximum
consumption tax increases
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6.3 Optimal taxation policy with only labor income risk
We now consider that households make their decisions in the presence of only labor income
risk ("). In each period, households may be subject to a positive labor income shock (" = )
that results in an increase on their labor remuneration of , or they may face a negative
labor income shock (" =  ) that reduces their labor remuneration by . In the following
graphical analysis we considered a  equal to 0.5.
Figure 3 illustrates the optimal taxation policy in the presence of only labor income
risk. The rst result is that the capital income tax should be zero independently of the
consumption tax. Since in our model the capital income tax was used as insurance against
capital income shocks, it is reasonable that in this particular scenario it should be set to
zero.
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Figure 3: Optimal consumption tax with labor income risk
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Furthermore, from the results of Section 5 we know that the householdsdecision over
capital at the steady state level is not a¤ected by the consumption tax. This is veried
in the second frame, where we see that the steady state capital level is equal to the rst
best capital level. Even though the householdsdecision regarding capital is not a¤ected
by the consumption tax, this scal instrument is relevant in this framework. Similarly
to what happens in the presence of idiosyncratic capital income risk, the consumption
tax can be used to reduce the volatility of consumption. In the bottom frames, we see that
when the government increases the consumption tax the volatility of consumption decreases.
The intuition is that in the good state of nature, when the households face positive labor
income shocks, the government uses proportional consumption taxes to reduce consumption.
In the bad state of nature, the government also taxes consumption, however there is a
positive income e¤ect due to the lump-sum transfers that results in an overall increase in
consumption. By increasing consumption when a household faces a negative labor income
shock and decreasing consumption when a household is subject to a positive labor income
shock, the consumption tax behaves once again as an insurance.
Figure 4 reinforces the results obtained in Section 5.1. Once more, we see that the
optimal taxation policy in our economy is setting the capital income tax to zero and taxing
consumption as much as possible. As the consumption tax rate converges to innity, we
observe that the consumption in the good state of nature decreases signicantly and that
the consumption in the bad state of nature increases exponentially. If it was feasible to
apply such tax rates, the variability of consumption would be entirely suppressed and we
would be in a rst best situation.
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Figure 4: Optimal consumption tax with labor income risk, as the maximum
consumption tax increases
6.4 Optimal taxation policy with capital income risk and labor income
risk
In this section, we will consider that households may be subject to both types of risk
simultaneously. Furthermore, we will assume that the capital income shock and the labor
income shock are correlated.
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6.4.1 Negatively correlated capital income risk and labor income risk
We start by considering a perfect negative correlation between the income shocks. We
consider that in one state of nature a household faces a negative capital income shock
( =  0:2) and a positive labor income shock (" = 0:5), whereas in the other state of
nature the household is subject to a positive capital income shock ( = 0:2) and a negative
labor income shock (" = 0:5).
Figure 5 illustrastes the optimal taxation policy with capital and labor income risk when
the magnitude of the labor shock is high. In this set up, we conclude that it is optimal to
subsidize capital and that the subsidy decreases with the consumption tax.
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Figure 5: Optimal consumption tax with negatively correlated capital income risk
and labor income risk
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In Figure 6, analyze the optimal scal policy in this set up as we increase the range
of possible values for the consumption tax. We observe that if we use an innitely large
consumption tax instead of subsidizing capital we eliminate the variability in consumption
and the steady state level of capital converges to the rst best level of capital.
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Figure 6: Optimal consumption tax with negatively correlated capital income risk
and labor income risk, as the maximum consumption tax increases
6.4.2 Positively correlated capital income risk and labor income risk
We then considered a perfect positive correlation between the income shocks. In other
words, we assumed that in one state of nature a household faces simultaneously a negative
capital income shock ( =  0:3) and a negative labor income shock (" =  0:1), whereas
19
in the other state of nature the household is subject to a positive capital income shock
( = 0:3) and a positive labor income shock (" = 0:1).
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Figure 7: Optimal consumption tax with positively correlated capital income risk
and labor income risk
Figure 7 illustrates the optimal scal policy in this set up. Firstly, we observe that the
optimal capital income tax slightly decreases as we increase the consumption tax. This
result is similar to the one obtained in Section 6.2. and the reasoning behind this result is
the same, we use the consumption tax as a mean to reduce volatility so the role of the capital
income tax as an insurance measure becomes less relevant. Furthermore, we observe that
under this specication of uncertainty consumption becomes less volatile as we increase the
consumption tax. Figure 8 shows that in this framework it is optimal to tax consumption at
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an innitely large rate and to set the capital income tax to zero in order to fully eliminate
the volatility in consumption and to reach the rst best level of capital.
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Figure 8: Optimal consumption tax with positively correlated capital income risk
and labor income risk, as the maximum consumption tax increases
7 Concluding remarks
In this work we show that, even though the potential of consumption taxes is neglected at
times, they can be powerful scal instruments. In our set up, we provide an example of a
stochastic model in which a tax on consumption can be used to provide insurance against
capital income shocks and labor income shocks.
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In the presence of idiosyncratic capital or labor income risk, we concluded that it is
optimal to tax consumption at the highest rate possible. Given the reasonable levels for the
consumption tax, we are not able to eliminate the capital income tax entirely. However,
we are able to reduce the capital income tax which has a positive e¤ect on the steady state
level of capital and on the welfare in our economy.
When households face a labor income shock, the capital income tax should be zero.
But, uncertainty created by the labor income shocks can be signicantly reduced using
consumption taxes. In the periods in which a household is subject to a positive labor
income shock consumption tax is used to decrease the disposable income and consequently
decrease consumption. On the other hand, when a household faces a negative labor income
shock is able to smooth the e¤ect of this shock due to the lump sum transfers that result
from the taxation of consumption of the other households.
In conclusion, in our stochastic neoclassical model the non state contingent consumption
tax fullls the purpose of reducing the variability in the householdsincome, thus increasing
the overall welfare in this economy.
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8 Appendices
8.1 Numerical analysis
In this appendix, we derive the expressions that were needed to the perform the numerical
analysis of the optimal taxation problem.
8.1.1 Expected value of consumption
We made the simplifying assumption that there were two states of nature to enable com-
putations. Furthermore, in order to have the expected value of the shock capital income
shock and the expected value of the labor income shock being both equal to zero (E() = 0
and E(") = 0), we assumed that each state of nature occurs with equal probability.
Then, we derived the expression for consumption in each state of nature and the expected
consumption. From the individual resource constraint we know that the consumption of a
household can be written as a function of the income shocks:
Ct(t; "t)(1 + 
c
t) +Kt+1    ctE [Ct(t; "t)] = F (Kt; 1) + (1  )Kt + "t + (1  kt )tKt
C(; ") =
AK   K + "+ (1  k)K +  cE [C(; ")]
1 +  c
Given our simplifying assumption, we are able to write the expected value of consump-
tion as:
E [C(; ")] = 0:5Ch + 0:5Cl
E [C(; ")] = 0:5

AK   K    + (1  k)K +  cE [C(; ")]
1 +  c

+0:5

AK   K +    (1  k)K +  cE [C(; ")]
1 +  c

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1  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Finally, using equation (17) we obtain the following expressions for the consumption in
the two states of nature:
Ch = C(; ) = AK
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k)K +  cE [C(; ")]
1 +  c
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8.1.2 Planners problem
We reach the optimal solution of the planners problem when the rst order conditions with
respect to the decision variables are veried. Thus, we solved this problem by imposing
that the derivatives of the Lagrangian with respect to the endogenous variables needed to
be equal to zero.
Firstly, we set the rst order condition with respect to the capital income tax (k) to
zero and obtained an expression for the multiplier associated with the Euler equation ():
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Afterwards, since we know that the rst order condition with respect to consumption
also needs to be binding, we were able to derive an expression for the multiplier associated
with the individual resource constraint as a function of the income shocks ((; ")):
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From equation (21) we can derive the expression for the multiplier associated with each
state of nature:
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Finally, using equations (22) and (23) we imposed that the rst order condition with
respect to capital needed to be binding:
@L
@Kt+1
= 0
E [t(t; "t)] = E
h
t+1(t+1; "t+1)
h
1 + Fk(Kt+1; 1) + (1  kt+1)t+1   
ii
+tE
"
u0
 
Ct+1(t+1; "t+1)

1 +  ct+1

1  kt+1

Fkk(Kt+1; 1)
#
27
E [(; ")] = E [ (; ") [1 + Fk(K; 1) + (1  k)   ]]
+E

u0 (C(; "))
1 +  c
(1  k)Fkk(K; 1)

[0:5h + 0:5l] = 0:5h

1 + AK 1 + (1  k)   

+0:5l

1 + AK 1   (1  k)   

+

0:5C h + 0:5C
 
l
1 +  c
(  1)AK 2 (1  k)

[h + l] = h

1 + AK 1 + (1  k)   

(24)
+l

1 + AK 1   (1  k)   

+

C h + C
 
l
1 +  c
(  1)AK 2 (1  k)

In conclusion, after imposing that the rst order conditions for the capital income tax
(k) and for consumption (Ct(t; "t)) were equal to zero, we found the optimal taxation
policy by choosing the tax rate that made equation (24) binding.
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